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Abstract—As an increasing amount of businesses look towards
collaborations to gain a strategic advantage in the marketplace,
the importance of systems to support these collaborative activities
significantly increases. Within this area, arguably one of the most
important issues is supporting interaction security. This is both
at the initial, higher level of humans from businesses agreeing on
joint security needs and the lower level of security technologies
(communication protocols, VPNs, and so on). As there has been
a substantial amount of work on the latter level, this work-in-
progress paper tries to restore some of the balance by considering
the problem of supporting companies at the business (and more
social/human) level of interactions. We focus particularly on
the initial tasks of negotiating and reconciling their high-level
security needs. Our specific aim is therefore to explore the design
of a model which replicates the human decision-making process
with regards to the reconciliation of conflicting security needs
at this higher level. The modelling of such a process is a prime
area for research in the socio-technical field because it seeks
to formalise several social aspects not typically modelled in a
technical sense.
Index Terms—Security actions and requirements; security
risks; human negotiations; decision-making model; social aspects;
interdependent security
I. INTRODUCTION
The automation of security functionality at the lower level
of systems and technologies has been commonplace for
many years now. Security professionals and users alike can
choose from various suites of security systems to automate
everything from protecting themselves and their organisations
from malicious attacks, to setting up secure communications
with internal and external entities, and even negotiating and
resolving potentially conflicting system security requirements
and goals. Although there has been significant progress within
this technical layer, it is fair to say that this has not been
replicated when interacting at the business and more human
level, and dealing with security there. In this context, security
actions (i.e., ways in which a company responds to a set of one
or more risks that it faces) are specified in natural language and
are relatively high-level, rather than being formally structured
and defined in a system-specific context.
One specific example of the disparity in technical and
business layers is the difficulty in finding tools to automate
(or at least, assist in) the, at times complex and arduous
task, of comparing, negotiating and reconciling business-level
security actions. At the technical level however, there have
been numerous discussions and system proposals (e.g., [1–3])
on similar security interaction topics. These three activities
are important particularly because they are central to progress
in the initial stages of companies entering cross-enterprise
collaborations such as joint ventures and extended enter-
prises [4]. The rationale for this disparity in levels is somewhat
understandable and undoubtedly links to two aspects. The first
one is the difficulty in specifying these actions (and the social
factors supporting them) in a formal and highly structured
way such that systems can process and reason on them. And
secondly, there is the subjective and variable nature of each
company’s security needs. Nonetheless, given the benefits of
supporting any automation of such negotiation tasks, we do
believe it warrants consideration. These benefits relate to the
time saved by businesses in negotiations, avoiding the mayhem
[5] prevalent with such activities and the overall increased
productivity likely to result.
In this paper therefore, we take the opportunity to build on
favourable results from previous work [6, 7] on the similar
problem of supporting security negotiations, and explore the
development of a simple model to assist in the reconciliation
of conflicting security action types. The classic example of
conflicts is where one company wants to mitigate a particular
shared risk (for instance, the risk that results from highly
skilled attacks on Web services-based communications be-
tween parties), while its partners want to accept or simply
insure against it. This could be because they do not view
the risk as impactful or likely. We identify four action types
(accept, mitigate, transfer and avoid [8,9]) as the focus of our
work and define conflicts as areas where these types fail to
correspond, thus highlighting differences in risk treatment.
As can be expected, there are numerous concerns and con-
siderations in creating such an approach. Of these, probably
the most intriguing is the question—how can a representative
tool-based reconciliation be undertaken that would lead to
credible decision support for conflicting security actions. As
this is a key foundational part of the approach, this research
question has been selected as the focus for this paper. The
novelty of this work is twofold. First, is the attempt itself
to allow some level of automation support in the reconcil-
ing of conflicting business-level security actions/decisions —
complete automation is not the goal as we appreciate there
are various aspects best handled by humans. Second, is the
process that guides this task and the actual model. This process
is different in that it aims to include several social decision
factors not traditionally incorporated in a mathematical sense
and build a representative decision model.
To aid in answering the aforementioned question, Section II
begins this paper with an analysis of how decisions – and par-
ticularly the security action reconciliation decision – could be
formally modelled. Formal modelling is necessary as it allows
for straightforward software processing. With a prospective
decision model defined, a simple example is presented in
Section III to demonstrate its application in supporting a
reconciliation decision between three interacting companies’
personnel. Following the example, there is a detailed discus-
sion of some of the main issues which arose in modelling and
overall limitations of the decision model to date in Section IV.
As this is primarily a work-in-progress paper, it is these
issues and limitations which are of greatest interest as they
highlight directions for future work. In Section V, some first
impressions on the decision model itself and its aims are
presented and assessed. These impressions were gathered from
security professionals in a round of semi-structured interviews.
We then reflect briefly on the importance of trust to our
research and the model in Section VI. Section VII highlights
some related research while conclusions and avenues for future
work are presented in Section VIII.
II. DECISION MODELLING
A. Scope
When businesses entering into an extended enterprise or
partnership come together for initial negotiations, they are
likely to have a number of security actions that conflict
with each other. The questions that arise therefore are—how
should companies proceed? And, whose security actions, if
any, should be adopted? In previous research [6], we have
studied a related problem in detail and defined a support model
(Solution Model) and tool to assist security professionals
from different organisations in initial collaboration tasks. The
aims at that earlier stage were centred around collecting
all the required security information and influential factors
in decision-making before companies met, structuring that
information appropriately, and consequently using the tool to
produce informative reports to assist partnering companies in
quickly identifying key discussion areas and making decisions
on their joint security posture.
The objective now is to explore the extension of those aims
to determine whether enhancements to the Solution Model
and tool might be able to support some level of automated
(system-based) decision-making. To allow for this, we aim to
investigate the formalization of the manual decision-making
process which companies’ personnel engage in. Formalization
here refers to defining the process using a mathematical model
in which decision aspects, particularly the social factors which
influenced decisions, are explicitly defined and quantified.
Based on our prior research and discussions with security
professionals, this decision-making activity consists of three
core steps. Firstly, companies’ personnel outline the factors
supporting their security actions (i.e., aspects, social and oth-
erwise, that dictate how they treat a specific set of one or more
risks). Next, parties implicitly weigh and generally combine
the importance and influence of those factors as they relate to
the security decision (this is analogous to building an argument
in support of their decision). Finally, analysts and security
professionals compare security actions and their justifications
(typically the strength of supporting factors and generally
‘the argument’) with other companies’ respective decisions
to ratify similar actions but more importantly, to reconcile
any conflicting ones. Reconciliation may mean selecting one
action (e.g., the one with the strongest argument) or defining
an entirely new action which is satisfactory to all partners.
B. Building the Model
To assist in formalizing the security action decision process,
the research field of decision making and specifically Multi-
Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) is referenced. Apart from
the obvious correlation, this field is seen to be appropriate
for this work from numerous perspectives. These include
the provision of structured methods to design mathematical
decision models, a well-established literature base and finally,
a process that appreciates decisions with multiple inclusive
factors/criteria. Furthermore, MCDM models are recognized
techniques to support decision making and guide decision
makers towards identifying a preferred course of action [10,
11], a central goal of our work.
As it relates to decision modelling and the application
of decision-making techniques involving numerical analysis,
Triantaphyllou [11] identifies three essential steps. These are
(i) determining relevant criteria (these are defined as the
means used to judge an alternative) and alternatives (that
is, final decision choices), (ii) attaching numeric values to
the relative importance of criteria and to the impacts of the
alternatives (also known as performance) on these criteria,
and (iii) processing the numerical values to determine the
ranking (preferences) of alternatives. Belton and Stewart [10]
substantiate these steps but also supplement them by empha-
sizing the additional advantage of using numerical analysis
to complement and challenge intuition. This thereby increases
understanding of the problem and the final decisions made.
This is also an interesting avenue for our work. Next, the
three steps listed are used to define a proposed security-action
decision model.
To complete the first step, we draw on the findings from [?,
8, 12, 13]. Based on these research articles, when making a
decision on what type of security action a company should
take to treat to a risk, salient motivational factors include Laws
and Regulations of the host country, Contractual Obligations
to other parties, Business Policies, Security Policies, Security
Budgets (particularly, very limited ones) and the related Risk’s
Severity Level (typically classified as high, medium or low).
Several of these (with the exception of risk level) we regard
as social concepts that have not often been transposed to the
technical world. In terms of the decision model therefore, these
six factors can be seen to constitute the decision criteria; we
accept that there are likely other factors but these were felt
to be most generally appropriate. Using a similar process
and with appreciation of our higher level focus on action
types, the alternatives identified were Mitigation, Acceptance,
Transference and Avoidance security action decisions.
Having defined model aspects, the next step (according
to [11]) is attaching numerical measurements. These are used
for calculations and final ranking of security action alterna-
tives. In MCDM, criteria values are typically used to represent
relative weights of importance. For each criterion therefore, a
value between 0 and 1 is to be stated that symbolizes the
relative importance of the criterion to the decision maker.
Relative means that values also relate to other criteria values
stated such that their total sums to 1. The determination
of criteria weights can be done in a few ways, but one of
the most commonly used techniques is based on pairwise
comparison. This technique was proposed by Saaty [14] and
extensive discussions on it are available in [11, 14, 15]. At
a very basic level, this approach focuses on getting decision
makers to compare pairs of criteria according to importance
and rank them on a defined scale. Normalization methods are
then applied to derive relative weight values for each criterion.
Standard questions in the technique are therefore, comparing
criterion X with criterion Y , whether X is absolutely more
important than Y , whether X is moderately more important
than Y , whether X is equally important to Y , whether X is
moderately less important than Y , and so on.
In terms of this research’s security-action decision model,
there are two options to determine criteria weights. The first
option consists of each company’s decision makers using the
pairwise comparison technique and entering the values them-
selves. Saaty [15] supplies a comprehensive manual example,
but such functionality could be built into any software/system
we propose. This option has the benefit of directly drawing
upon decision makers’ perspectives and thereby possibly being
a more representative model. Also, each company would have
their own tailored weights. The second option also involves
pairwise comparison but looks at the provision of standard
or default weight values for companies’ use, which are based
on the security industry’s knowledge (garnered using polls to
professionals or security standard bodies). This bypasses the
need for additional work by companies (in conducting pairwise
comparisons) by relying on a generic weighting which could
be held constant across collaborating parties. As these options
each have their benefits, both are expected to be included in
the model (and resulting software) at some stage. This would
allow for flexibility in that, if businesses are more concentrated
on understanding and having a representative model, they
could use a pairwise comparison system feature. However,
if they are primarily interested in speeding up the process
and using common weights across parties, the second option’s
feature could be chosen.
To gather further insight into the pairwise comparison
technique and generate some initial weights which could be
used in our work, we applied it to determine the standard
weights for the six criteria presented above. Considering the
substantial detail present in this method, limited space in
this paper and the fact that the final weights are of more
importance and novelty to this research, we do not include
the process here; readers are directed to [16] for detail on the
method, process and value calculations. The respective criteria
weights calculated are, Laws and Regulations (LR) at 0.409,
Contractual Obligations (CO) at 0.285, Business Policies (BP)
at 0.111, Security Policies (SP) at 0.116, Security Budgets
(SB) at 0.053 and the related Risk’s Severity Level (RL)
at 0.026. The consistency ratio of 0.0982 indicates a good
consistency of the comparison data entered and choices made
(see [14] for more on consistency ratios).
Briefly commenting on the weights produced, one can
see the great deal of importance associated with Laws and
Regulations as they contribute just over 40%. Contractual
Obligations are also key considerations with roughly 30%. A
Risk’s Severity Level or a limited Security Budget, however,
only contribute relative weights of 2.6% and 5.3% respectively
to a security decision. This was an interesting finding because
even though Security Budget and Risk Level were crucial
factors when looked at individually (if relying on absolute
instead of relative weights for example), when compared to
other criteria, they were often seen as notably less important.
Similar to the Risk Level and Budget values, the Business
Policies and Security Policies of companies only gained small
relative values, 11.1% and 11.6% respectively. This was note-
worthy from the perspective that even though policies dictate a
business’ mission and operations, legal structures such as laws,
regulations or contractual obligations are always paramount.
Objectively speaking however, these weights do not claim or
profess to be perfect. Different decision makers may arrive at
different weights and these are likely to all be valid given they
are justified and maintain a good consistency ratio [14]. The
reality that different weights will lead to different final deci-
sions/outcomes is also accepted. The advantage of subjectivity
in that case is that the final decision will reflect the opinions
of the decision makers who defined the weights and therefore
would cater more to their context.
Progressing from attaching numeric values to criteria, the
next step is quantifying the impact (hereafter, performance)
of the alternatives on the criteria. This seeks to define how
companies felt about criteria as they pertained to a specific
security action decision made. To allow for a more appropriate
analysis and emphasis on criteria influence, there was a slight
variation from the norm at this stage. Therefore, instead of
the usual aim of determining how well an alternative fulfils
criteria, the objective was determining how much an alternative
was motivated or influenced by criteria. This change was not
noted to have any negative side effects on modelling.
Unlike criteria weights, performance values are entirely
supplied by businesses’ decision makers near to decision time.
There were two choices apparent in the literature ([11]) for
entities to decide performance values. These were, pairwise
comparison in terms of criteria (which leads to relative values)
or allowing decision makers to specify absolute values. In
the interest of not prolonging or further complicating the
decision/transition phase for companies, the latter option was
chosen. The Weighted Sum Model (WSM) [11] is an example
of a commonly used method that employs absolute values.
For this research, absolute values in the range of 0 to 10
were allowed for entry by companies to define the extent to
which an alternative was motivated by a criterion type. To ease
usability for companies’ personnel, a Likert scale [17] could
be provided (in the model and resulting software) listing five
items, each with corresponding representative absolute values.
These are: 1. Very Important (score of 10.0), 2. Important
(score of 7.5), 3. Moderately Important (score of 5.0), 4. Of
Little Importance (score of 2.5) and 5. Unimportant (score of
0). In terms of a decision therefore, they would be applied, for
example as follows: “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the criterion)
was Very Important (the performance) in making the Security
action decision to mitigate a risk (the selected alternative)”.
Another example of the use of this scale and the values will
be shown in Section III.
The last step in Triantaphyllou [11] focuses on processing
the numerical values to determine the ranking of each alterna-
tive. For this task, the WSM method of processing numerical
data was used. Other methods were considered but proved
either to be too complicated or to require too much information
from decision makers for this research’s context. The Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) [14,15] is a good example of a pop-
ular technique that was debated but later overlooked because
of its heavy emphasis on pairwise comparisons to determine
all input values (both criteria weights and performance values).
That emphasis would require a level of user input that would
most certainly not aid the initial negotiation on security actions
across partnering companies. The formula for WSM (sourced
from [11]) is presented below. This pulls together all of the





aijwj , for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m. (1)
Here, A∗WSM−score is the WSM score of the theoretically
best supported alternative, n is the number of decision criteria
(social and otherwise), aij is the actual performance value of
the i-th alternative in terms of the j-th criterion, and wj is the
weight of importance of the j-th criterion. This formula can
stand as the formal model to define the security action decision
process, the A∗WSM−score score capturing which company’s
security action is best supported (has maximum value) and
thus might be preferred. Below is a simple example using the
proposals thus far.
III. A SITUATION EXAMPLE
Assume a situation where there are three companies about
to enter a partnership and they have conflicting business-
level security actions for a particular shared risk related
to maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of inter-
organisational Web services-based communications. That is,
Buyer is vying to mitigate it, Supplier prefers to accept
it and Distributor wants to insure against the risk and
thereby transfer it to an insurance company. Below, we list
the factors behind each company’s decision and also suppose
that the performance values provided have been chosen by the
businesses’ personnel.
Factors supporting Buyer’s mitigation-based security action:
– If the related risk were to materialise, there would be a
significant impact on the business and interactions with
external partners. This leads to our rating of risk severity
as High, and subsequent mitigation action. — Therefore,
Important was selected to indicate that the Risk Severity
Level criterion was Important in making the decision to
mitigate the risk.
– Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 requires that com-
panies should be able to confirm that only authorized
users have access to sensitive information and systems.
— Therefore, Very Important was selected.
– Our security policy strongly advocates the protection of
the integrity and confidentiality of all potentially sensitive
communications. — Therefore, Important was selected.
Factors supporting Supplier’s acceptance-based security
action:
– There is very limited security funding and therefore we
are unable to implement more comprehensive security
measures at this point. — Therefore, Very Important was
selected.
– From our risk analysis, it has been deemed unlikely that
this risk would materialize as existing basic authentication
measures are thought to provide adequate security. —
Therefore, Very Important was selected.
Factors supporting Distributor’s transference-based secu-
rity action:
– Our security policy states that security risks to confi-
dentiality of company data classified as Private, must be
handled. — Therefore, Important was selected.
– Cutbacks in the company have led to an extremely
limited security budget for this year. — Therefore, Very
Important was selected.
– A law exists that emphasizes that risk should be handled.
The law permits that handling via insurance is an allowable
alternative. — Therefore, Important was selected.
The following decision matrix puts the data above, criteria
weights and respective performance values into context.
Criteria
LR CO BP SP SB RL
Alternatives (0.409 0.285 0.111 0.116 0.053 0.026 )
Mitigation 10 0 0 7.5 0 7.5
Acceptance 0 0 0 0 10 10
Transference 7.5 0 0 7.5 10 0
To apply the WSM formula, the scores for the three alterna-
tives are:
Mitigation = 10× 0.409 + 7.5× 0.116 + 7.5× 0.026 = 5.155
Acceptance = 10× 0.053 + 10× 0.026 = 0.79
Transference = 7.5× 0.409 + 7.5× 0.116 + 10× 0.053 = 4.4675
Therefore the best supported alternative (in the maximiza-
tion case) is Mitigation, Buyer’s choice. The SOX Act (a law)
supporting their decision being a key reason due to the large
weight assigned to the Laws and Regulations social factor.
This example presents a simple application of the decision
model defined. From that illustration, it is apparent that the
model works on the basis that the action with the ‘strongest’
support is preferred. This seeks to be similar to the manual
negotiations process where the best justified or supported
action is chosen. The next section continues discussion of the
proposed model and presents its most notable limitations and
thus, areas for analysis in future work.
IV. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
One of the greatest novelties about the proposed model is
that it tries to formally accommodate a number of previously
under-represented social factors in the decision process. This
advances existing literature and approaches where primarily,
only risks and risk levels were scored and valued. Whilst it
is understood that risks allow the easiest formal and numeric
(especially monetary, in terms of loss potential) definition, the
various other high-level and social factors in a security-action
decision process should also be considered. This research
attempts to provide a logical start towards a model that aims
at the high-level inclusion of such factors. Having discussed
the proposed reconciliation model in the previous section, its
main limitations are now outlined. These highlight known
practical limits in the decision model, but additionally areas
that surround the further formalization of crucial decision
factors. We focus especially on the model’s internal restric-
tions rather than the external data-entry component where
companies’ personnel are required to input values for weights
and performances. We do nonetheless appreciate that this also
forms somewhat of an issue in terms of at what points data
are input, who inputs that data, how does one arrive at the
measures, and how does one ensure values are representative.
Other ongoing research is considering these aspects.
The first general limitation of the decision model is that it
does not account for multiple factors/criteria of the same type.
For example, if a company has four laws supporting a security-
action decision instead of one, the model should reflect this,
potentially by a greater weighting or performance value. A
greater influence or ‘argument’ would be the likely behaviour
in real-world negotiations. Currently however, the decision
model does not. Possible solution options to accommodate
this include having extra parameters for each additional factor,
or building such aspects into the performance Likert scale.
For example, only allowing Very Important to be selected
if three or more factors/criteria of the same type support a
security action decision. This aspect therefore needs to be
considered further. An additional issue in dealing with laws
(and potentially one or two other external factors) specifically,
is that if a law prescribes a particular treatment for a risk,
that treatment has to be adopted, there is no need for further
comparison or room for negotiation. Where two or more
companies have laws supporting different treatments therefore,
the model/tool would not be able to process this case and
would therefore need to fully defer the reconciliation task for
that risk to businesses’ personnel.
Another potential restriction of the model is that it regards
decision alternatives in an isolated manner. For example,
assume there are ten companies in a scenario, nine desire
to transfer a risk, but one company opts to mitigate it.
Furthermore assume that the mitigation company has the
maximum calculated value (that is, A∗WSM−score). According
to the model, all companies should adopt this decision. Even
though this occurrence is a possibility, in the real-world it
is probable that majority vote might triumph. One way to
tackle the isolation issue might be to sum decision values
from companies with the same security action type. Then,
compare these totals and choose the action with the maximum
value. Provided the nine businesses above had a summed total
greater than the total of the one, their action type would be
selected. Albeit accommodating, there is one caveat to even
this technique however. This lies in the reality that the majority
vote might always prevail even in situations where it might
not be best. Future work would therefore have to investigate,
monitor and balance this carefully.
The next limitation relates to the complexities of the
security-action decision process and the interrelation between
its components not encompassed by the model. An example
of this is a situation where a company has a single action
that addresses ten security risks. Arguably this action should
receive an increased weighting or performance value simply
because of the fact that it covers so many risks; its removal
therefore would potentially lead to ten risks being untreated.
The problem in the model here is that it focuses on security
actions on a risk-by-risk basis and not more generally as is
possible in actual interactions. There is also the argument that
the specific risk or specific risk’s severity level plays a part,
instead of just noting the generic Risk Severity Level criterion.
Thus, possibly in situations where a risk has a severity level
of ‘High’, this should be given a slightly greater (or lower,
depending on the context) weighting than where a severity
level of ‘Low’ supports a company’s security action decision.
Additionally and more from an interrelation perspective, the
model does not support links across social factors, risks or
treatments, nor is it retrospective. Concerning the last point,
the model can suggest that companies mitigate a risk instead
of accept it, but it does not look at the impact that decision
might have on other risks or factors. For example, such a
decision might mean that there is less budget (money) to spend
on mitigating another risk, therefore that other risk may now
need to be avoided or accepted by the collaboration. These
are complex issues not addressed by the model as yet, but
which represent actual negotiations and discussions. Further
comprehensive work is needed in this area to see how these
aspects can be captured and to what extent.
The last debatable aspect of the model relates to decision
makers. In MCDM techniques, there is typically a single, or
group of decision makers concentrating on a specific decision.
If it is a group, they first need to agree on input values
(typically through consensus or voting) then enter them into
the approach. The approach processes these values and selects
a preferred alternative based on maximum scores. The same
decision makers therefore provide all the input values. In this
research’s model however, each company may go through
the decision-making process individually and then at the
end supplies their security action summation score (formally,∑n
j=1 aijwj) to the system. This score is then compared with
other companies’ decision scores regarding the same risk and
the maximum is chosen as the preferred or best supported
alternative. Therefore, different decision makers supply input
values. Although the use of separate decision makers seems
like a useful and valid application of the MCDM technique, no
literature could be found which also applies it. Further work
therefore should encompass the evaluation of this particular
application and its ultimate viability.
To briefly summarize this reflection section, there is still a
great deal of work to be done in creating a highly representa-
tive, formal decision model. This paper has provided a well-
grounded start to that process by identifying a basic model
which included a number of previously under-represented de-
cision factors particularly from within the social context. Even
though these factors are difficult to value and accommodate,
they form key parts of the decision process and should be
duly represented. In looking towards any level of automated
reconciliation support therefore, the biggest challenge will
be in identifying the minimum level of data input and time
commitments necessary, which leads to the greatest, most
useful security-action reconciliation assistance. After all, the
focus is easing phase transition and not complicating or
prolonging it further. There must also be an appreciation
however that on occasion, even small levels of automation
will simply not be possible or feasible. For example, take the
situation where two or three companies have mandatory laws
that support conflicting security actions. Or, consider the case
where companies have very high scores or very close total
scores. Boundaries will be needed in the system to flag these
situations and for further discussion by personnel.
Finally, as identified previously, there is additional scope
beyond reconciliation for aiding understanding of security-
action decisions. Weighting and performance data provides a
rich source of information which explicitly defines compa-
nies’ perspectives. This information could be used to support
complex or detailed negotiations processes, as opposed to
streamlining security negotiations.
V. FIRST IMPRESSIONS ON THE DECISION MODEL
The creation of a decision model that replicates the human
decision-making process with regards to the reconciliation of
conflicting security needs was explored for several reasons.
Firstly, the novelty of such a model itself that especially aims
to include a number of social decision factors not usually
incorporated in a formal or mathematical sense. Secondly, the
favourable feedback on current research [6, 7] which forms
an ideal basis for the model. Finally, there is the additional
time likely to be saved by businesses in negotiations and
the overall increased productivity that could possibly result if
any level of automation in the decision-making process could
be achieved. The last of these points was especially relevant
noting the importance placed on time and productivity by
security professionals in [6]. This is an interesting proposal
from a research perspective, but because this tool is ultimately
aimed at industry use, gaining some real-world feedback even
at this early stage would be very useful. This would help
to put the proposals into a practical context and give a first
impression regarding feasibility. To attain real-world feedback
on the decision model therefore, questions on the model and
its aims were posed to five security professionals in separate
interviews. The interviews were of a semi-structured nature
and lasted for around 15 minutes. Professionals possessed a
total of 48 years experience in the security field and had all
previously engaged in cross-enterprise security negotiations.
Below a brief analysis is conducted on the feedback gathered.
Fictitious names are used to preserve the identities of the
participants and any link to their employers.
At a general level, security professionals regarded the notion
and process of a model for reconciliation as ‘interesting’, but
expressed that a great deal of analysis and proofing would be
required. John, a security professional of 10 years working for
a leading international IT and consultancy services company,
summed up interviewees’ views in his statement, “it’s an
interesting idea, but the exact nature of the formula or the risk
factors, how that would work, I think I’d want to see more
examples, to prove to me that it works and makes sense”.
Finally he added, “but I think it’s an interesting idea worth
exploring”. This and similar views from most professionals are
taken to support the feasibility of future investigations towards
modelling and potential levels of further automation.
There was a single view not in support of fully automated
reconciliation. This came from Mark, the most experienced
security professional amongst interviewees. He strongly felt
that the goal should be towards modelling to aid in decision
making and complementing understanding—not therefore, in
providing definitive answers for security. Mark stated, “I’m not
a firm believer in, you press the button for risk assessments
and you get the answer out”. This opinion was likely due to
Mark’s view that risk assessments and some aspects of security
were an art and not a science, therefore human aspects still
need to be present. This is a salient point as it provides a
reminder of the continued need for some human presence even
in this level of the negotiation process. Furthermore, it alludes
to the possibility that the real use of our model may be more
towards assisting understanding of the decision process. This
is rather than any attempts, although not foreseen, towards full
automation.
Lastly, professionals agreed with the general set of social
factors included in the model and were unable to identify
any other core ones. They also concurred with the notion
of degrees of importance of social factors/criteria (such as
Laws or Policies) in terms of a security-action decision. For
example, a relevant law may influence the treatment of a risk
more than a related security policy. Interviewees’ agreement
therefore acted to directly support the reasoning behind the
performance or impact values (i.e., the Likert scale) discussed
prior.
In summary, a majority of interviewees viewed the proposal
as interesting, but noted that it required a great deal of analysis
and validation. The main opposing perspective referenced the
need for humans to actually make the reconciliation decisions
(instead of a tool). This opinion was linked to the perception
that risk assessments and aspects of security are more of an
art (therefore somewhat subjective and mutable) than a science
(strictly defined). This is a very valid and salient perspective
and therefore future work is expected to concentrate slightly
more on modelling for decision support and not towards expert
or fully automated systems. Even if tool-based reconciliation is
not used for definitive solutions to security conflicts, a model
and tool that could present an initial solution that would then
need to be ratified by a human, would support negotiations
more than the existing research [6] currently allows. In the
next section, we consider the notion of trust and how it relates
to and influences the success of the model.
VI. THE TRUST FACTOR
Similar to any other negotiation or joint decision-making
process in businesses [18], trust is paramount in our work.
If partners are to realise any benefits, including increases in
productivity or faster negotiations, from use of the model
and tool, there must be good levels of trust and information
sharing across entities. Trust touches several aspects of the
model and reconciliation process, but generally these fit into
two categories: trust in the information that business partners
provide and trust in the tool’s security-decision output. General
discourses on trust and information trustworthiness can be
found as necessary here [18, 19].
At the level of business partnerships, trust has always been
crucial. For the model to function properly, firstly there must
be trust that partners will include only pertinent social factors
to support their security-action decisions. Including irrelevant
factors would inaccurately inflate the respective partner’s secu-
rity action score, to the detriment of other partners. Likewise,
there must also be trust that collaborators will supply correct
criteria weights and representative performance values. Rating
all aspects with very high performance, or reverse engineering
the system to define highest criteria weights for the business’
security actions is counter-productive and can only serve to
hurt the partnership. If businesses identify any suspicious
input values from partners or one-sided tool output, they are
encouraged to follow these up with the respective company.
Any evidence of system or model coercion may be taken itself
as an early indicator that the offending partners may not be
trustworthy and pursuing a long term business partnership with
them might be ill-advised. At the very least, there would need
to be more caution exercised in future dealings.
Another level where trust is important is in what the model
and tool suggest as the ‘best justified’ security action for
collaborating companies. Although it is a trivial calculation, as
with most software there are slim chances of malfunctioning
and miscalculations; doctoring of results may even be an issue
if the system is implemented by a malicious partner. This
issue becomes an even more serious concern where the tool is
used as a first-pass filtering mechanism to compare hundreds
of security actions originating from several collaborators.
Businesses’ security analysts interested in saving time and
increasing productivity may well choose to focus only on
situations where there are conflicting security actions types
for risks or irreconcilable differences that need to be actively
discussed by personnel. The assumption is therefore that the
tool’s initial comparison is accurate and as such, the security
actions not flagged for human follow-up need no further
consideration or investment of precious business time and
effort at this point. This is an assumption that may be improper
if there are any errors in the system. The main way to approach
this and to build trust in the system is to conduct checks on the
tool and occasional human validation of all its suggestions and
information output flows. Moreover, although certain levels of
automation may be possible, as stated before in this paper, the
tool is not to replace decision makers but only to support and
quicken the process. Thus, human security analysts should be
checking a majority, if not all of the action suggestions made
by the tool to ensure they fit in with the security ethos and
direction of the collaboration.
VII. RELATED WORK
Interorganisational security has been researched by numer-
ous articles in the literature. Dynes et al. [4] is one of the
more relevant research works that emphasises the problem
and identifies several business cases in Critical National
Infrastructure, Manufacturing and Financial Services where
concerted approaches to security are required. Within that
article, they outline numerous building blocks to a holistic
security solution across interacting enterprises. We believe that
our work can fit adequately within these blocks, particularly
when deciding security strategy and agreeing on treatment
of risks. This would assist directly in supporting security
negotiations and expediting any necessary decisions between
collaborating entities.
The topic of interdependent security is also relevant to this
paper’s research. Interdependent security as a concept uses
game theory models to investigate how security investment
decisions in one company (or unit) depend on what other inter-
acting (interdependent) businesses (or units) are doing [20,21].
For example, it has been shown that there is less incentive
for a business to invest in security if collaborating businesses
do not invest, because the business is still vulnerable to
risks propagated from the less secure partnering systems. This
research is relevant to our work generally as it reinforces the
interconnection of security decisions and at the lower level in
the interrelation between risk treatments. The main difference
is that the model in our research holds that partners should
agree on the same treatment for shared risks. Therefore, there
is no divergence and hence no need for tipping or cascading
behaviour as apparent in the interdependent security approach.
In [22], the authors develop a quantitative model to define
interdependent security investments based on ‘linear influence
networks’. According to them, the agents in their model
interact in a perfect information game, resulting in a unique
Nash Equilibrium. Their further work [23] also considers this
problem in terms of security investments in interdependent or-
ganisations. Our model is similar to theirs in its consideration
of security decision models, but differs for similar reasons as
with the interdependent security approach above. Moreover,
we have the unique aim of formal inclusion of social factors
(e.g., laws, policies, contractual obligations) into our decision
model, a goal that is not shared by that or several of the other
works in the security field.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The aim of this paper was to explore the design of a
model which replicates the human decision-making process
with regards to the reconciliation of conflicting security needs
across collaborating businesses. To achieve that goal, we
utilised existing research and drew on interactions with secu-
rity professionals on how such a decision is made. For support
of the formal modelling activity, the field of MCDM was
referenced. This was done both to guide modelling and with
the aim of creating a more appropriate, grounded formula.
Once this was completed and a model defined, a simple
example was presented to illustrate the model’s application.
Following the presentation of the model, it was discussed in
detail and its limitations highlighted. Even though the model
itself is viewed as a novel proposal for the socio-technical
field which challenges current research thinking regarding the
formalization of social aspects, its limitations are slightly more
important here. This is because they identify key issues for this
(especially in terms of future work) and other research which
attempts to formally define such a decision process. We then
presented high-level feedback from industry-based security
professionals on this initial decision model. Generally, pro-
fessionals showed interest in the conceptualisation but noted
that much more testing and analysis would need to be done.
This at least provides some level of support for the feasibility
of the ideas and thus the need for future research in this area.
Lastly, we considered the notion of trust and highlighted why
good levels of trust across collaborating entities was crucial
to the success of the model and any decision-support it would
provide. Trust has always been a significant component in
business interactions and that importance is simply maintained
here.
As it relates to further work, we aim to focus specifically on
the limitations from Section IV and act on how these may be
resolved. From there, the next task is to conduct a case-study
to evaluate the model’s use in the real-world including how
well it is able to model the process and factors and to what
extent it outputs usable decisions.
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